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High-dimensional quantum systems are vital for quantum technologies and are essential in demon-
strating practical quantum advantage in quantum computing, simulation and sensing. Since dimen-
sionality grows exponentially with the number of qubits, the potential power of noisy intermediate-
scale quantum (NISQ) devices over classical resources also stems from entangled states in high di-
mensions. An important family of quantum protocols that can take advantage of high-dimensional
Hilbert space are classification tasks. These include quantum machine learning algorithms, witnesses
in quantum information processing and certain decision problems. However, due to counter-intuitive
geometrical properties emergent in high dimensions, classification problems are vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks. We demonstrate that the amount of perturbation needed for an adversary to induce a
misclassification scales inversely with dimensionality. This is shown to be a fundamental feature in-
dependent of the details of the classification protocol. Furthermore, this leads to a trade-off between
the security of the classification algorithm against adversarial attacks and quantum advantages we
expect for high-dimensional problems. In fact, protection against these adversarial attacks require
extra resources that scale at least polynomially with the Hilbert space dimension of the system,
which can erase any significant quantum advantage that we might expect from a quantum protocol.
This has wide-ranging implications in the use of both near-term and future quantum technologies
for classification.
Quantum technologies promise exciting advantages in
quantum computation [1], simulation [2], metrology [3]
and cryptography [4]. Even while large-scale and fault
tolerant quantum technologies currently remain out of
reach, noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices
[5] hope to deliver advantages over classical systems in
the near-term. Most of these protocols exploit not only
unique quantum characteristics like entanglement and
superposition, but also high-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
Without the latter, no sizeable quantum advantages in
either computation, simulation or sensing are expected.
One important class of tasks where high-dimensional
Hilbert spaces may be advantageous are classification
problems. To correctly categorise an object belongs to
one of the most common and basic questions asked in
science. In the quantum setting, classification problems
can appear mainly in one of two ways. Firstly, a quan-
tum protocol can be used for classification problems with
classical data in order to gain a quantum advantage in
speed or precision. Many quantum-enhanced machine
learning algorithms are of this type [6]. Alternatively,
one can classify quantum states or processes themselves,
in terms of entanglement [7], phases [8] or other many-
body behaviour. Quantum learning protocols also belong
to the latter category [9].
From these examples, it therefore appears that ad-
vantages for classification tasks will become more pro-
nounced as Hilbert-space dimension grows, at least in
the absence of noise. However, as we will see, this is
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no longer true when the classification protocols are sub-
ject to adversarial perturbations. These are small, often
hard-to-detect perturbations of the object to be classi-
fied which give rise to deliberate misclassification. This
is highly relevant for many classification problems. In the
machine learning context in particular, security breaches
in the algorithm are not only desirable for adversarial
parties, but also made possible as data used for classi-
fication are often shared amongst multiple, possibly un-
trusted parties [10]. Recent findings in machine learning
suggests that even highly successful classification algo-
rithms can be very vulnerable to adversarial perturba-
tions if the dimension of the data is high enough, such
as high-resolution image data [11]. Some quantum ma-
chine learning algorithms that resist certain kinds of ad-
versarial attacks have also been recently developed [12].
However, it is yet unknown what the fundamental limits
to adversarial robustness are for quantum classification
problems in general.
In this paper, we demonstrate that a perturbation by
an amount scaling inversely with the dimension of the
quantum system to be classified is sufficient to induce a
misclassification. Amazingly, this is a fundamental fea-
ture of quantum classification originating from a purely
geometrical property of high-dimensional spaces, known
as the concentration of measure phenomenon [13]. It
is independent of the specifics of any particular classifi-
cation protocol. Furthermore, detection of these small
perturbations by existing efficient certification protocols
for quantum systems cannot be efficient. For classifica-
tion problems, otherwise efficient certification protocols
must now require resources scaling polynomially with di-
mensionality. This is an exponential resource cost in
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
04
28
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
10
 M
ay
 20
19
2the corresponding number of qubits and can thus po-
tentially erase any key quantum advantage from using
high-dimensional quantum systems in the first place.
This result presents a fundamental trade-off between
the resources for preserving the security of the quantum
system and resource advantages for classification proto-
cols that exploit high-dimensional Hilbert space. Classi-
fication protocol that classify either raw quantum data
or classical data embedded into quantum states will be
subject to this limitation. Thus, this leads to widespread
implications for many quantum classification tasks in-
cluding, quantum machine learning algorithms, some wit-
nesses in quantum information amongst others. To gain
a more intuitive understanding of this result, we begin
with examining what is special about classification prob-
lems, whose output belongs to a countable set. We com-
pare this to quantum computational algorithms or other
quantum protocols whose output can take on any contin-
uous value.
Suppose we have two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice
wants to perform a classification task on an input quan-
tum state σ, which is selected from the set Σ. The classifi-
cation device Alice uses implements a function v : Σ→ <.
This function can be written as v(σ) = Tr(OΛ(σ)), where
Λ is a CPTP map performed by the device and O is an
observable measured at the output of the device. For a
classification problem, the final answer needs to be con-
strained to a discrete set of values and these are known
as class labels. Thus v(σ) can be converted into dis-
crete values h(σ) by using some thresholding function,
e.g. h(σ) = sign(v(σ)) for binary classification.
However, Bob may be a possibly adversarial party who
can induce a small perturbation about σ that goes unde-
tected by Alice. This means σ is modified into a state ρ
where Alice is able to detect when F (σ, ρ) < 1 − χ but
unable to detect when F (σ, ρ) ≥ 1 − χ. Then it can be
shown, by applying Uhlmann’s theorem, that |v(ρ)−v(σ)|
is bounded above by a quantity proportional to
√
χ (see
Appendix A). Thus a small χ, which corresponds to a
large overlap between σ and ρ, can result in a small dif-
ference O(χ) in the final real-number output of the quan-
tum device.
Although this might suggest that quantum protocols
may in some cases be robust against perturbations of the
input state, adversarial or otherwise, this inference does
not necessarily hold for classification problems. Classifi-
cation problems care about the discrete class label h(σ)
rather than v(σ) itself. Thus if v(σ) lies very close to the
decision boundary for h, even a small χ with correspond-
ing small |v(ρ)−v(σ)| can mean ρ is classified differently
to σ, i.e. h(σ) 6= h(ρ).
This observation hints that, for classification problems,
it is really the concentration of points near a decision
boundary that matters, which can be mathematically
captured by the concentration of measure phenomenon.
Although already widely-used in quantum information
in the context of quantifying average quantum behaviour
of random quantum states [14] and related applications
in cryptography [15], it has not yet been employed for
classification problems in the quantum setting. Notably,
in many situations, this concentration of measure phe-
nomenon predicts a growing concentration of points near
such a decision boundary as the dimensionality of the
problem increases. We will see that this implies that
higher-dimensional quantum classification problems are
more vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. To for-
malize our result, let us first introduce the following def-
initions.
Definition 1. Suppose we want to assign classification
labels s ∈ S to elements σ ∈ Σ where S is a countable set
and σ can be either classical or quantum data. σ can refer
to either states or processes. Functions c : Σ→ S, belong
to the set C known as ground truth if c(σ) gives the true
classification label for any σ. These functions are not
generally directly accessible. Functions belonging to H
known as the hypothesis class are the accessible guesses
to the ground truth.
Definition 2. We select σ from Σ with respect to a prob-
ability measure µ and µ(Σ) = 1. Let M be the set of
states that are misclassified by h ∈ H, i.e, M = {σ ∈
Σ|h(σ) 6= c(σ)}. Then we refer to µ(M) as the risk,
which is the probability that the selected σ is misclassi-
fied by h.
Definition 3. Let there be metric defined over Σ and
the corresponding distance measure be denoted D. Then
the −expansion of subset Σ˜ ⊆ Σ is defined as the set
Σ˜ = {σ|Dmin(σ, Σ˜) ≤ }, (1)
where Dmin(σa, Σ˜) is the infimum of the distance between
σ and any element of Σ˜. Then we call µ(M) the adver-
sarial risk under the perturbation of states σ by distance
. This is equivalent to the probability that there is at
least one state σ′ where D(σ, σ′) ≤  which is misclassi-
fied by h, i.e., h(σ′) 6= c(σ′).
Definition 4. For Σ˜ ⊂ Σ with distance measure D and
probability measure µ, we can define the concentration
function α() as α() ≡ 1 − inf{µ(Σ˜)|µ(Σ˜) ≥ 1/2}. If
Σ˜ is also equipped with a vector space with dimension d
and
α() ≤ l1e−l22d, (2)
the corresponding space can be said to belong to the
(l1, l2)-normal Levy family, where l1, l2 > 0.
Here α() quantifies the extent to which points in Σ
concentrate about the boundary lines of Σ˜ ⊂ Σ. A
small α() means a large concentration of points near
such boundaries. For those spaces which belong to the
normal Levy families, we see that this concentration near
the boundary increase exponentially as the dimension d
of the space increases. This is the concentration of mea-
sure phenomenon.
3We now focus our attention on Σ = SU(d) where
SU(d) is the special unitary group. This choice will
become clearer when we discuss our two scenarios. We
can select σ ∈ SU(d) randomly according to the Haar
probability measure and our goal is to classify σ where
the risk is µ(M). Suppose h(σ) = c(σ). However, if σ is
perturbed, for instance by an adversarial Bob, then the
following theorem applies.
Theorem 1. Suppose σ ∈ SU(d) and a perturba-
tion σ → ρ occurs, where dHS(σ, ρ) ≤  and dHS is
the Hilbert-Schmidt distance. If the adversarial risk is
bounded above by R, then 2 must be bounded above by
2 <
4
d
ln
(
2
µ(M)(1−R)
)
. (3)
Proof. We only give the basic intuition behind the proof
here, which is also based on recent classical machine
learning results in [16]. Please refer to Appendix B for de-
tails. It is possible to show that having SU(d) equipped
with the Haar probability measure and Hilbert-Schmidt
metric belongs to the (
√
2, 1/4)−normal Levy family,
thus obeying Eq. (2). We choose Σ = SU(d). If the
subset of misclassified points is denoted Σ˜ = M, then
Eq. (2) shows that more and more points tend to con-
centrate around the boundary ofM as d increases. So if
we select a point outsideM, as d increases, the distance
between the chosen point and the nearest point in M
becomes smaller. This makes it more likely that only a
small perturbation can result in misclassification. 
From theorem 1, we see that with large d, even a very
small perturbation can result in a misclassification. As a
result, it also becomes more and more difficult to certify
whether or not σ has been adversarially perturbed. Fur-
thermore, to certify whether a small perturbation has
occurred requires extra resources in the quantum set-
ting and these resources grow with increasing dimension.
Thus a tension develops between the resources required
to ensure robustness against misclassification and the
quantum advantage expected as the dimension grows.
Our aim is then to find fundamental limits to this ten-
sion that is independent of the details of any particular
classification protocol. To describe this trade-off more
precisely, in the following sections we examine two gen-
eral scenarios, which we call untrusted state preparation
and untrusted device preparation, depicted in Figure 1.
Untrusted state preparation— Alice wants to prepare and
classify a d-dimensional pure quantum state σ, or equiva-
lently a log2 d-qubit state. Let σ = U |b〉〈b|U†, where U is
Haar-randomly selected from SU(d) and |b〉 is some given
pure d-dimensional quantum state. Alice has a classical
description of her σ, but does not have the quantum re-
sources to create σ. She delegates to Bob the preparation
of N copies of σ.
However, Bob may be adversarial. He instead prepares
a state ρ˜. This has the same dimensionality as σ⊗N and
ρ˜ = σ⊗N only when Bob is honest. So Alice assigns
Nstate registers of ρ˜ to certifying whether Bob could be
an adversary. She can choose either state tomography
or state certification for her test. Since state tomogra-
phy demands more resources than state certification, it
suffices to examine only the latter.
In general, Bob has the capability of preparing any ρ˜
where (i) ρ˜ is some general entangled N register state
with dimension 2Nd, (ii) ρ˜ = ⊗Ni ρi where each ρi has
dimension d or (iii) ρ˜ = ρ⊗N . For our purpose here in
finding a lower bound to Nstate, it is sufficient to consider
case (iii). Thus Alice’s certification task is to ascertain
if F (ρ, σ) > 1− χ to some high probability 1−∆ where
χ small enough so that adversarial perturbations cannot
be hidden. If this condition is not satisfied, then Alice
rejects the state. Since (i) and (ii) require larger Nstate
[34] our following results still hold for these cases.
There are two main approaches to state certification.
The first is the direct estimation of fidelity F (ρ, σ). To
estimate the fidelity to precision η with failure proba-
bility ∆ requires the measurement of at least 1/(∆η2)
different Pauli observables. Hence at least this many
copies of ρ are needed [17]. An alternative approach re-
lies on a collection of binary-outcome measurements used
to make the binary decision that the state satisfies either
F (ρ, σ) = 1 or F (ρ, σ) < 1 − χ [35]. However, since our
aim is to find the minimal resource requirements for when
F (ρ, σ) > 1 − χ, the fidelity estimation approach better
suits our purpose.
While improvements to state certification methods at-
tempt to decrease the dependence of Nstate on d, the
assumption is always of a constant η that is independent
of d. The key difference in our scenario is that now it is
η itself that carries a dimensional dependence. If Alice
now sets R as the upper-bound to the adversarial risk
she is willing to tolerate, the following statement holds
true.
Theorem 2a. Let Alice’s quantum classification device
implement the function h(σ) and let M be the set of
states that h(σ) 6= c(σ). Alice needs Nstate copies of
ρ to estimate the fidelity F(σ, ρ) to a precision that is
necessary to guarantee that the adversarial risk is at most
R with failure probability ∆. Then she requires at least
Nstate ≥ d
4
g2(µ(M), R)∆ (4)
copies of ρ, where g(µ(M), R) = 2 ln(2/(µ(M)(1−R))).
Proof. We sketch the basic ideas behind the proof here
and refer the reader to Appendix C for details. Alice’s
selection of state σ is equivalent to her selecting U Haar-
randomly from SU(d) [36]. Thus we can use Eq. (3)
in Theorem 1. Next we need to change the Hilbert-
Schmidt distance  into the corresponding quantum fi-
delity, used for Alice’s state certification scheme. Then
Eq. (3) can be shown to be equivalent to F (σ, ρ) ≥
1 − g(µ(M), R)/d2 where g(µ(M), R) is a function in-
dependent of d. This means that the error in estimating
the fidelity must satisfy η < g(µ(M), R)/d2. Using the fi-
delity estimation approach [17], Nstate > 1/(∆η2). Thus
Nstate > d4/(g2(µ(M), R)∆). 
4FIG. 1: Top. In the absence of an adversarial Bob, Alice performs her classification task in three steps. First she prepares
her input quantum state σ. She then inputs σ into her classification device which outputs a real number v(σ). Then Alice
computes the corresponding class label by applying some thresholding function v(σ)→ h(σ) and obtains the correct class label
hcorrect. However, in many situations, Alice would want to delegate either her state preparation of σ or the preparation of her
classification device to Bob. Even if Alice can certify the state or the device after receiving it from an adversarial Bob, she can
still misclassify the input state if the dimension of σ is high. Untrusted state preparation (bottom left): Alice asks Bob for state
σ and Bob instead returns the state ρ. Alice certifies that ρ is close to σ in fidelity and gets the output v(ρ) = v(σ)+δv(σ) from
her device. Even when δv is small, once mapped to h, there can be a misclassification hincorrect. Untrusted device preparation
(bottom right): Similarly, suppose Bob prepares the device implementing Λ instead of U and gives it to Alice. She is able to
certify the device to some precision, and obtains the output v + δv where δv is small. However, small δv can still result in a
misclassified label hincorrect if the dimension of σ is high enough.
It is crucial to note that now N has a polynomial de-
pendence on the dimension, which derives from the poly-
nomial dependence of η on dimensionality. This has sig-
nificant implications for the robustness of classification
protocols against adversarial perturbations. Theorem 2a
states that the minimum certification cost is exponen-
tial in the size of the quantum system, even when the
certification protocol is considered otherwise efficient.
For example, in quantum-enhanced machine learning
algorithms, there are claims of quadratic and even up
to exponential quantum speedups in d compared to the
corresponding classical machine learning algorithms [6].
However, it is often assumed that the state preparation
for converting classical data into quantum input states
is delegated to an oracle, otherwise the resources for
state preparation itself can over-ride resources potentially
saved by employing a quantum algorithm [18]. This could
be made possible for instance by delegating quantum-
random-access memory (QRAM) capabilities to Bob [6].
Yet, we saw that, even in the presence of such an ora-
cle, Alice’s certification requirements are of order at least
d4. This would then still overwhelm any claimed expo-
nential speedup and many quadratic speedup advantages
afforded by these algorithms. From this we see a trade-
off between security and speedup as dimensionality in-
creases.
Untrusted device preparation— Suppose Alice now
delegates only the preparation of the unitary part U of
her classification device to a possibly adversarial Bob.
Bob has no other power than the device preparation.
If Bob is honest, he returns the prepared U to Alice,
she inputs the quantum states |Ψ〉 whose source she
trusts. She then makes the final measurement on her
device to obtain the classification of those states. If
Bob is adversarial, then he may prepare a device that
implements the CPTP map Λ instead. Given that
Alice knows the classical description of U , she is able to
perform device certification, by estimating the average
channel-fidelity avg{|Ψ〉}Tr(Λ(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)U |Ψ〉〈Ψ|U†) [17],
where |Ψ〉 is selected Haar-randomly. Then by using
at least Ndevice > 1/(∆′δ2) calls to the device, Alice
can estimate this fidelity to precision δ with failure
probability ∆′. Similarly to the case in untrusted state
preparation, if Alice wants to classify the states |Ψ〉
selected like in Theorem 2a, the following result holds.
Theorem 2b. Let U be the unitary that Alice wants to
implement, which is used in a classification device that
misclassifies inputs states with probability µ(M). Sup-
pose Bob prepares, instead of U , the circuit implementing
a CPTP map Λ. Then Alice requires at least
Ndevice > d
4
g2(µ(M), R′)∆′ (5)
calls to her device to estimate the average channel-fidelity
to guarantee that that her adversarial risk is bounded
above by R′ with failure probability ∆′.
Proof. The ideas behind the proof are very similar
to Theorem 2a. Let δ now be the error in estimat-
ing the average channel-fidelity with failure probability
∆′. The channel estimation protocol [17] requires that
Ndevice > 1/(∆′δ2). Again employing Theorem 1 and
converting the Hilbert-Schmidt distance to that of aver-
age channel-fidelity, we find δ < g(µ(M), R′)/d2. Thus
5the number of extra certification resources required where
adversarial risk is bounded above by R′ is Ndevice >
d4/(g2(µ(M), R′)∆′). For details see Appendix D. 
An important example is in the context of quantum
learning, where we wish to classify states that we do
not have the classical descriptions of. These include for
instance quantum-template matching [19] and quantum
anomaly detection [20], where the control-SWAP gate
serves as the key component to the classification device.
Since control-SWAP gates, especially for large dimen-
sional systems, are difficult to experimentally realise [21],
these would be the gates delegated to Bob to prepare.
However, certifying the control-SWAP gates to a con-
stant precision η is insufficient and the minimum η to be
robust against adversarial attacks must grow with scaling
at least d2 [37].
Other applications—It is also possible to apply our re-
sults to cases where machine learning is used to iden-
tify witnesses of physical properties like non-local corre-
lations or the presence of phase transitions. Our results
depend on a crucial requirement that the misclassifica-
tion probability µ(M) > 0. This is almost always true
when the classification function is learned from examples
rather than derived from first principles. For instance, in
[7, 22], machine learning algorithms and training data
are used to learn the decision boundary to determine
whether a quantum state is entangled or separable and
here µ(M) > 0. Other examples include learning deci-
sion boundaries for classifying phases [8]. These scenarios
are all vulnerable to adversarial perturbations described
in this paper.
Discussion— While high-dimensional Hilbert spaces are
often considered beneficial for quantum information pro-
cessing, its vulnerabilities apart from sensitivity to de-
coherence are almost entirely unexplored. In this pa-
per we examine one important instance. For classifica-
tion problems involving quantum states or processes, we
demonstrate a fundamental bound showing how higher-
dimensional quantum systems are more sensitive to ad-
versarial perturbations than lower-dimensional systems.
This phenomenon is independent of any decoherence ef-
fects or details of any particular classification protocol.
Furthermore, any exponential quantum advantages in
classification are erased by this behaviour.
Our results so far come from finding bounds to the
minimum distance between Alice’s original datum σ and
the nearest element in the originally misclassified setM.
However, these nearest elements to σ might have zero
measure, thus cannot be reached if Bob perturbs σ in ran-
dom directions. These cases are significant to consider,
because it means that these misclassified points can only
be reached from σ by adversarial perturbations, i.e., Bob
deliberately moving σ to an element in M. Thus, an
important future direction is to examine the differences
between the resources required for Alice to remain robust
against adversarial perturbations to that of random per-
turbations or perturbations induced by noise, for instance
in [23]. This is particularly poignant in the NISQ-era of
quantum technologies.
To further understand the effects of high-
dimensionality, it is important to go to the extreme
case of continuous-variable quantum information, with
potentially infinite degrees of freedom. It is then com-
pelling to investigate whether these quantum systems
possess some maximal sensitivity to adversaries and if
this power can be harnessed to devise novel detection
methods.
We are now only unravelling the beginnings of how
high-dimensional quantum systems behave under adver-
sarial perturbations. This has both practical and founda-
tional ramifications. Its relevance will increasingly grow
as quantum devices are networked together in a future
quantum internet [24] and adversarial considerations be-
come inevitable.
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Appendix A: Robustness of quantum devices against
perturbations in the input state
Quantum devices used as part of computational prob-
lems are able to provide a real-number output v(σ) from
a given input quantum state σ. These devices implement
a CPTP map Λ and a real number can be extracted by
performing quantum measurements on Λ(σ) to obtain
Tr(OΛ(σ)), where O is an observable or POVM.
Suppose we allow a perturbation of our initial state
σ → ρ where F(σ, ρ) ≥ 1 − χ and χ << 1. Then for a
CPTP map Λ, Uhlmann’s theorem [1] holds
F(Λ(ρ),Λ(σ)) ≥ F(σ, ρ) ≥ 1− χ. (A1)
Thus any small adversarial perturbation of σ results in
an even smaller perturbation of the final state Λ(σ). We
define v(σ) = Tr(OΛ(σ)) as the output of the quan-
tum device and assume that both O and Λ(ρ) − Λ(σ)
are positive semi-definite. This means that we can al-
ways find matrices A, B such that O = A†A and
Λ(ρ) − Λ(σ) = B†B. The Frobenius norm of the
matrix AB satisfies the norm inequality ||AB||2F ≡
Tr(A†ABB†) ≤ ||A||2F ||B||2F = Tr(A†A)Tr(B†B). This
means that Tr(O(Λ(ρ)−Λ(σ))) ≤ Tr(O)Tr(Λ(ρ)−Λ(σ))).
Thus we obtain
|v(σ)− v(ρ)| ≤ |Tr(O)Tr(Λ(σ)− Λ(ρ))|
≤ 2Tr(O)
√
1−F(Λ(σ),Λ(ρ))2
≤ 2Tr(O)
√
χ(2− χ) < 2
√
2Tr(O)√χ, (A2)
where we used the Fuchsvan de Graaf inequality for the
trace distance |Tr(Λ(σ)−Λ(ρ))| ≤ 2√1− F (Λ(σ),Λ(ρ))2
in the second line.
This means that, if Tr(O) is small, then a small χ
corresponds to a small difference to the desired outcome
v(σ).
However, for classification problems where the final
output is constrained to a finite number of possible val-
ues, we will see that even small |v(σ) − v(ρ)| can result
in misclassification.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Let us begin with some definitions. We start with a
normalised metric probability space which is the set Σ
equipped with a probability measure µ and a metric D,
where µ(Σ) = 1. For any Σ˜ ⊂ Σ, µ(Σ˜) can be interpreted
as the probability that some point in Σ˜ is selected. Every
σ ∈ Σ is assigned a class label from a countable set, which
is determined by the function h(σ).
For Σ˜ ⊂ Σ with distance measure D and probability
measure µ, we can define the concentration function α()
as
α() ≡ 1− inf{µ(Σ˜)|µ(Σ˜) ≥ 1/2}, (B1)
where Σ˜ is the −expansion of Σ˜ defined in Eq. (1) in
definition 3. Here  is measured with respect to the dis-
tance measure D. The concentration function quantifies
the extent to which points in Σ concentrate about bound-
ary lines in Σ and this plays a crucial role in isoperimetric
theorems.
7For our purpose where Σ is the special unitary group
SU(d), and the corresponding metric probability space
belongs to a family of spaces with SU(j) where j is a
positive integer, including j = d. Such a metric prob-
ability space is said to be a (l1, l2)−normal Levy fam-
ily if their corresponding concentration function α() is
bounded above by
α() ≤ l1e−l22d. (B2)
Suppose σ is correctly classified, i.e., h(σ) = c(σ). Our
aim is then to find the smallest size  of the perturbation
σ → ρ so that D(σ, ρ) ≥  and ρ is misclassified with
adversarial risk at most R (see Definition 3). This would
be an adversarial perturbation that is small enough so it
is expected c(σ) = c(ρ), but the class label computed for
ρ differs from σ, i.e., h(ρ) 6= c(ρ) = c(σ).
This is equivalent to finding the shortest distance be-
tween σ and some point in the set of misclassified points
M = {σ ∈ Σ|h(σ) 6= c(σ)}. If this distance  satisfies
2 >
1
l2d
(ln(l1/µ(M)) + ln(l1/γ)), (B3)
then from Theorem 3.7 in [16], it can be shown that the
adversarial risk is R ≥ 1 − γ. For completeness, we
present our condensed version of the proof below.
Suppose we define 1 where µ(M) > l1 exp(−l221d).
Let the 1−expansion of M be denoted M˜. Then
µ(M˜) > 1/2. We can see this by looking at cases
(i) µ(M) > 1/2 and (ii) µ(M) < 1/2 separately.
When (i) is true, µ(M˜) > 1/2 follows immediately from
µ(M˜) > µ(M). For (ii), suppose µ(M˜) < 1/2. Then
µ(Σ \ M˜) ≥ 1/2. The set Σ˜ = Σ \ M˜ then gives rise to a
corresponding concentration function α(1) ≥ 1−µ(Σ˜1)
where α(1) < µ(M). Thus µ(M) + µ(Σ˜1) ≥ 1, which
means the two sets M and Σ˜1 share a point. However,
this also means that there is a point that is simultane-
ously in M˜ and Σ˜, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
µ(M˜) > 1/2.
Now we can look at the 2−expansion of M˜, which
is equivalent to the (1 + 2)−expansion of M. Then
the corresponding concentration function is α(2) ≡
1 − inf{µ(M˜2)|µ(M˜}. Thus the adversarial risk R
associated with a perturbation by  = 1 + 2 is
µ(M1+2) = µ(M˜2) ≥ 1 − α(2). If we now define
γ = l1 exp(−l222d) ≥ α(2), then R ≥ 1− γ.
Now we can set an upper-bound R to the adversarial
risk R ≤ R. This is the maximum tolerated proba-
bility of misclassification. By making the replacement
γ = 1 − R in Eq. (B3), we find that if 1 − R >
(1/µ(M))l21 exp(−2l2d), then R ≥ R. However, this
is a contradiction of our condition that R ≤ R. Thus, in
order to satisfy R ≤ R, a necessary condition to satisfy
is 1−R < (1/µ(M))l21 exp(−2l2d).
This then results in our following theorem: A necessary
condition for the adversarial risk to be bounded above by
R ≤ R is
2 <
1
l2d
ln
(
l21
µ(M)(1−R)
)
. (B4)
The interpretations here are quite clear: (i) If the di-
mensionality d is high, then a much smaller perturbation
can result in misclassification; (ii) If R is low, then a
smaller perturbation is sufficient to result in misclassifi-
cation; (iii) If the risk µ(M) is initially high, then only
a small perturbation can cause misclassification; (iv) If
l21 is low, then  is bounded to be small. This is saying
that if the space is more concentrated (i.e., more area
is covered by a small -expansion), then the adversarial
behaviour is more pronounced.
We now focus our attention on when Σ is the group
SU(d) and is equipped with the normalised Hilbert-
Schmidt metric and the Haar probability measure. We
now show this metric probability space is a (
√
2, 1/4)-
normal Levy family [28, 29]. We first employ the isoperi-
metric inequality [28, 30, 31], which states that for a sub-
set Σ˜ ⊂ Σ, where d = dim Σ, and µ(Σ˜) ≥ 1/2, the mea-
sure of the -expansion of Σ˜ satisfies
µ(Σ˜) ≥ 1−
√
2e−
2dR(Σ)/(2(d−1)). (B5)
Here R(Σ) = infτ Ric(τ, τ) and Ric(τ, τ
′) is the Ricci
curvature of Σ, where τ runs over all unit tangent vectors.
The condition for the isoperimetric inequality to hold
requires R(Σ) = (d − 1)/r2, which is the Ricci scalar
of a d-dimensional sphere with radius r. Then µ is the
normalised Haar measure on this d-dimensional sphere
with radius r.
Using the definition of the concentration function in
Eq. (B1), Eq. (B5) then implies
α() ≤
√
2e−
2dR(Σ)/(2(d−1)). (B6)
From [32], it can be shown for SU(d) that Ric(τ, τ) =
d
2G(τ, τ), where G(τ, τ) is the Hilbert-Schmidt metric
and τ is any vector in the tangent space of SU(d). There-
fore, R(Σ) = (d/2) infτ G(τ, τ). Then from [33] we find
that since G(τ, τ) = 1, R(X) = d/2.
This means for SU(d) we can rewrite Eq. (B7) as
α() ≤
√
2e−
2d2/(4(d−1)) <
√
2e−
2d/4, (B7)
thus showing SU(d) with the Haar measure and the
Hilbert-Schmidt metric is a (
√
2, 1/4)−normal Levy fam-
ily. Then inserting l1 =
√
2 and l2 = 1/4 into Eq. (B4),
we find
2 <
4
d
ln
(
2
µ(M)(1−R)
)
, (B8)
where  is measured in terms of the Hilbert-Schmidt dis-
tance.
8Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2a
Suppose we begin with a d-dimensional pure state |b〉.
Then by randomly selecting a unitary ui ∈ SU(d), this
is equivalent to selecting a random pure state defined
by |ψi〉 ≡ ui|b〉. Then we can map the problem of clas-
sifying pure states to the problem of classifying unitary
operations in SU(d), which satisfies the concentration
inequalities we have found in Theorem 1. Note that
here we can work with ui ∈ SU(d) instead of U(d) since
global phases do not make measurable differences to the
states.
In Theorem 1, our distance  is in terms of the Hilbert-
Schmidt distance between two unitaries u1, u2, which is
defined as
H(u1, u2)
2 = Tr((u1 − u2)†(u1 − u2))
= 2d− Tr(u†1u2 + u†2u2). (C1)
Let {|bi〉} be a basis set in our d-dimensional Hilbert
space. Then the Hilbert-Schmidt distance satisfies the
following inequality
H(u1, u2)
2 = 2d−
d∑
i=1
〈bi|u†1u2 + u†2u1|bi〉 (C2)
≥ 2d− dmax
i
〈bi|u†1u2 + u†2u1|bi〉
≥ 2d− d〈b|u†1u2 + u†2u1|b〉
≥ 2d− d(〈ψ1|ψ2〉+ 〈ψ2|ψ1〉) = 2d(1−<〈ψ1|ψ2〉)
≥ 2d(1− F (|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉)), (C3)
where F (|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉) ≡ |〈ψ1|ψ2〉| is the quantum fi-
delity between two pure states. Thus we have related
the Hilbert-Schmidt distance between two unitaries to
a distance-like measure between two quantum states.
This inequality is also tight, since H(u1, u2) → 0 as
F (u1, u2)→ 1.
We can now replace  in Eq. (3) with H(u1, u2). Sup-
pose |ψ1〉 is the state Alice wants Bob to prepare, but
Bob instead prepares |ψ2〉. Then inserting Eq. (C2) into
Eq. (3) we find that the minimum fidelity between |ψ1〉
and the perturbed state |ψ2〉 state must be bounded be-
low by
F (|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉) ≥ 1− 2
d2
ln
(
2
µ(M)(1−R)
)
, (C4)
where R is the upper-bound to the adversarial risk al-
lowed by Alice. We see that F (|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉)→ 1 as d→∞.
Note that the lower bound in Eq. (C4) still holds even
when Bob is allowed more general perturbations beyond
the purely unitary adversarial operations |ψ1〉 → |ψ2〉,
since more general perturbations must also include uni-
tary operations.
Using the direct fidelity estimation protocol in [17], we
know that the number of copies of ρ requires is at least
Nstate > 1
η2∆
. (C5)
In fact, since 1/(∆η2) is only the number of different
Pauli observables that need to be measured, the real
Nstate is in general much greater than this quantity.
While most work on fidelity estimation focuses on re-
ducing the number of required Pauli observables to mea-
sure by careful choices of observables, our focus is on the
dependence of N on η. It is only from the η dependence
on d that we have our extra resource cost to protect Al-
ice from adversarial perturbations of σ. To resolve the
value of fidelity to the required precision, from Eq. (C4)
we must therefore have
η <
2
d2
ln
(
2
µ(M)(1−R)
)
. (C6)
Inserting the inequality above into Eq. (C5), we find
Nstate > d
4
4 ln2
(
2
µ(M)(1−R)
)
∆
. (C7)
We note that although we could alternatively perform a
certification procedure via state tomography, the depen-
dence Nstate ∼ 1/η holds. Thus the resource overhead
polynomial in d required in the presence of adversarial
perturbations still applies.
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 2b
In this scenario, we trust the source of the input quan-
tum states, but we do not necessarily trust the quantum
device which actually performs the computation. This is
very similar to the untrusted state preparation scenario,
but now we move the adversarial perturbation from the
state to that of the device.
Let Alice trust the input states σ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| to the
classification device. Let U denote the unitary gate Alice
wants Bob to prepare as part of the classification device.
Bob instead prepares some circuit that implements Λ.
For instance, let UUadv denote one possibility of Bob’s
adversarial perturbation where Uadv is another unitary.
To guarantee
avg|Ψ〉|〈Ψ|U†UUadv|Ψ〉|
= avg|Ψ〉|〈Ψ|Uadv|Ψ〉| ≥ 1− χ′ (D1)
for some χ′ with failure probability ∆′, one requires an
estimation of avg|Ψ〉|〈Ψ|U†UUadv|Ψ〉| to precision δ < χ′
with the same failure probability. The channel certifica-
tion protocol in [17] can be employed where Ndevice >
1/(∆′δ2) calls to the device are needed.
Similarly to the results in Theorem 2a, a condition
that can guarantee robustness against adversarial per-
turbations with adversarial risk at most R′ requires clas-
sification device satisfies
min
|Ψ〉
|〈Ψ|Uadv|Ψ〉| ≥ 1− g(µ(M), R′)/d2, (D2)
9where g(µ(M), R′) = 2 ln(2/(µ(M)(1 − R′))). This
means that the precision δ to which we must measure the
average channel-fidelity must likewise bounded above by
δ < g(µ(M, R′))/d2. (D3)
Thus
Ndevice > d
4
g2(µ(M, R))∆′ . (D4)
